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Summary.--The studies  and cases reviewed suggest  that settlement  programs are
too often designed  on an assumption  that all settlers will or can succeed. This has
led to too much centralized  administration  and rigid designs, rather than reliance
on decentralized  approaches,  flexibility  in implementation,  support  to spontaneous
settlement,  and reliance on settlers' own investment  capacity. Collective  forms of
crop production have not worked. Crop land are best allocated to individual
families, and their land rights must be clearly defined  as ownership or long term
leases. Farmn  sizes have to be flexibly adjusted to skills, family labor availaoiity
and capital ownership  of the families. Settlers should  therefore be allowed to sell
or rent the land to other beneficiaries. If poor settlers are to be benefitted and
succeed, settlement  cannot be based on credit finance but must include grant
elements. Patemalistic  constraints  on crop choice, technology,  marketing  or labor
market participation have usually not  been enforceable or  have had adverse
effects.
The many helpful  comments  of the participants  at the worlshop in Swaziland  where an earlier version  of
this paper  was presented  are gratefully  acknowledged.  We would  also like  to express  our appreciation  for the
generously  detailed  comments  provided  by S. M. Jinya and E. A. Attwood  on the workshop  version  of the
paper.CHARACTERISTICS kND PERFORMANCE OF SEITLEMENT  PROGRAMS:
A REVIEW
Table of Conter.r
Sufmmary  . Page  i
1*  INTRODUCTION.  Pago  1
2.  CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
(a)  Land tenure, allocation rules  and  practice.  Page  5
(b)  Scale of program.  Page  9
(c)  Size of holding  ......  .......  . Page  9
(d)  Type of  scheme organization and administration  Page  11
(e)  Combinations of settlement
with  contract farming  ....  .Page  17
(f)  Modalities of land acquicition  .Page  17
(g)  Settler selection rules and  practice  . .Page  18
(h)  Restrictions imposed on settlers .Page  20
(i)  Provision  of  infrastructure  and
speed of construction .Page  21
(j)  Access to and modality of supply of services  Page  22
(k)  Social  services.  Page  26
(1)  Resource base  .. Page 2'
(M)  Cost per beneficiary family  . .Page  27
(n)  Grant elements in settlemert programs .Page  28
(0)  Cost recovery.  Page 28
(p)  Settler groups  .Page  29
3.  CONCLUSIONS  .Page  30
Notes  .. Page 32
References...  Page  341. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the characteristics  and performance of settlement  and resettlement
programs. We were prompted to undertake  this review because of our interest in a possible
land reform for South Africa, where the questiorn  is whether land belonging  to about fifty
thousand  large scale commercial  farms, and covering about 87 percent of the arable area of
the country should be subject to land reform for the benefit of black an colored populations.
As in other countries with highly dualistic  farm size structures, the commercial  farm sector is
highly mechanized,  and as a consequence,  employs only relatively few workers (or labor
tenants).  Redistributing  the farms to just these remaining workers will create farms which
have too few family workers to operate efficiently  without maintaining  the current high
degree of mecharization  or hiring casual workers. The beneficiaries,  however, are unlikely
to be sufficiently  wealthy or have access to subsidized  credit which will permit them to hire
the necessary workers or buy the required machines. In order to maintain  or increase
productivity  of the distributed farms, additional  beneficiary  families will have to be resettled
onto the farms. This approach is also necessary  to extend the benefits - land reform to rural
populations  which are no longer resident  on the commercial farms.  Lanu refcrms involving
settlement  are much more difficult undertakings  than reforms of landlord-estate  systems,
where, as in most of Asia, ownership  rights were transferred to tenants  who were already in
possession  of the land, had implements  and draft animals, and knew the local climate, soils
and farming techniiques. Only if the settlement  componerAt  of the land reform program is
properly designed can a land reform involving  large scate commercial  farms succeed.
The scope of our review, therefore, is the worldwide setdement  experience,  whether in the
context of land reform or not and regardless  of the administrative  nature of the programs.
The programs analyzed therefore  inclide planned settlements  executed by governments,
private settlement  by companies  or social or religious groups, as well as the regularization of
and support to spontaneous settlements  or land invas:ions.
Resettlement  with agricultural  production  as ore of its core objectives  has been undertakenon every continent,  creatiig a literature  of great  size.' As noted  by Hulme  (1988),  much  of
the literature  is fragmentary  and idiosyncratic,  reflecting  the fact that there  is no generally
accepted  methodolo3ical  approach  or theoretical  basis  for the analysis  of resettlement
schemes. He characterizes  three broad  categories  of analysis: 1) coriventional  evaluations,
the majority,  are based  on empirical  approaches  to scheme  or poiicy  performance;  2) the
social  consequences  approach,  as practiced  mainly  by sociologists  and anthropologists,  is
concerned  with the impact  of schemes  on individuals,  families  and communities;  and 3)
radical and political  approaches,  derived  from theories  of the role of the state  in
development.
We have examined  a wide  range  of literature  in all throe  of the categories  identified  by
Hulme and have  chosen  to use the individual  researchers',  or government  or agency
officials',  judgments  of success  rather  than to impose  from a distance  our own interpretations
of success  or failure. Because  the bulk of the literature  comes  from the first of Hulme's
categories,  assessments  of performance  here are unavoidably  weighted  heavily  by the
disciplines  in which  researchers  have  been  trained-principally  agricultur, economics,
geography  and public  administration.  Moreover,  and it is an important  qualification,
evaluations  in this category  tend to present  static  descriptions  and tc glos=  over processes  and
relationships.  This deficiency  cannot  unfortunately  be remedied  by balancing  cunventional
evaluations  with  those  drawn  from the social  consequences  literature,  as there  is too little  of
the latter to serve  as an effective  counterbalance.  Finally,  because  the radical  and political
approaches  generally  eschew  judgments  about  success  or failure  of the specific  characteristics
in which  we are interested,  this approach  is least  represented  in what we have  to say.
In addition  to the individual  stud s we have  drawn  on reviews  by other researcherso  on
institutional  reviews  such  as those  of World  Bank  assisted  programs,  and on some
government  documents.
.
-2-We also undertook a more detailed  review of the characteristics  of the following  progmrms
Burlina Faso  w
river valley resettlement  following  onchocerciasis  clearance
Ethiopia  P
imperial and post-revolution  resettlement
Guatemala  l
resettlement  based on a market-directed  altemative to land reform
Indonesia
transmigration  resettlement  (both official  and spontaneous)
Kenya
irrigated resettlement  (pre- and post-independence)
I. dryland  resettlement  (pre- and post-independence)
spontaneous  resettlement
Malaysia
official  resettlement  based on perennial  crops and employment creation
Zimbabwe
irrigated resettlement  (pre- and post-independence)
dryland resetdlement  (post-independence)
spontaneous  resettlement
We are seeking to evaluate individual  characteristics  of resettlement  rather than pass
definitive  judgements on the success  of the complete  package  of activities in resettlement
.programs.  We distinguish two broad groups of interrelated variables:
The first group contains the implementation  characteristics  of resettlement  such as:  scale
(overall  size, average holding size and number  of settler families);  organization (public,
private, spontaneous  or mixed), sources of funding  for land acquisition, infrastructure  and
credit; settler seiection rules and practice; land allocation rules and practice; land rights
(freehold/leasehold/tenancy,  pledging, subdivision  and inheritance); restrictions  (crops
grown, markets, employment  and others); provision  of infrastructure  and speed of
construction;  access to and modality of supply  of production services (credit, extension,
tillage, ihrigation, stolage, marketing  and transport);  access to and modality  of supply of
social services (health, education, hotusing,  water and sanitation);  quality of the resource base
(soils and water); cost per beneficiary  family;  grant elements (in land cost, infrastructure,
credit and social services); cost recovery  rules (for land, infrastructure, social Fervices  and
credit); costs and timin,, of cost recovery; and the speed of formation,  organization,
autonomy  of and participation  in settler groups.
We want to evaluate the impact of the implementation  characteristics  on the second group of
variables, the outcome of resettlement. This group of outcome or performance  variables
includes yields and production levels; family income levels; asset accumulation  and savings;
consumption  levels; poverty alleviation;  responsive  capacity; diversification  of production
patterns; land trading and reaggregation  and/or subdivision  of holdings;  environmental
impacts; stability of settlement; and sustainability  of farming systems.
Very few if any settlements  will be successful  in all outcome variables. And very few
studies contain details on more than one or two outcome variables. But since we are
interested in the specific characteristics  associated  with success, and not in the package  as a
whole, even judgments of success in some  dimensions  will be illuminating.
Economic  investigations  often suffer from a severe lack of reliable data, and few evaluations
cover more than one point in time. There is the additional difficulty  of choosing  an
-4-appropriate tih-'e  frame for studying  resettlement. In the short- or medium-term,  agricultural
settlement  projects that mmain  on a subsistence  level will not generate many stimuli to
economic  develkpnient. Yet in the longer term, even projects of this nature may produce
beneficial  development  effects by concentrating  population  in ways which allow growth
opportunities  to be realized in other economic  spheres.  Resettlement  projects judged to have
been successfui  in  t  or more dimensions  appear to have passed through a series of 3-to-5-
year stages of evolution In which settlers have adjusted to their changed circumstances  in
ways that affected perfornatu.e and impact (Chambers, 1969; Colson, 1971; Moran, 1979;
Scudder, 1973, 1975 and 1984;  Scudder  and Colson, 1979 and 1981; Kebschull, 1986).2
Most of the e-aluations we have examined  are set however in static, cross-sectional
frameworks.
2.  CHARACTERISTICS  AND PERFORMANCE
(a) Land tenure, allocadion  rules and  practice
The land tenure system defines  rights and obligations  with respect to acquisition and use of
land in agricultural settlements,  and the review of land settlement  projects reveals that they
incorporate a wide array of tenure systems,  reflecting local customs, differing legal systems
and specific  progran  objectives.
It is clear on the basis of the review that no settlement  program can succeed without a clear
tenure  policy.  Four issues arise:  1) whether to allow for individual  holdings  of arable land
or insist on collective methods of farming, 2) whether to grant permanent  ownership rights or
only usufruct rights, 3) whether to allow for sales and rental of land or to constrain land
transactionis,  ar 1d 4) if land sales to outsiders  are unrestricted, whether or not to issue title.
The record shows uniformly that collective  forms of land use, where the farm is managed  as
a single large-scale unit and members  receive labor points and profit shares, are associated
-5-with very high failure rates. 3 This parallels the poor experience with collective: in the
socialist world, where they have been or are being abandoned. World Ban.-ass13ted
irrigation projects in Mexico with collective  farming and tenure performed poorly relative to
those where land reforn  beneficiaries where given individual  plhts.  Where beneficiaries  of
land refcrm or settlement  schemes were organized  ias  collective  farms, as in Peru, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Mexico, for cxample, they have most often subdivided the holdings
informally.  In Zimbabwe, colivctive  ccoperativ- settlem.ents  (Model B schemes')  are self-
managed but showed  poor group cohesion (Akwabi-Ameyaw,  1990).  In a single year more
than 20 percent of collective cooperatives  disbanded,  and new groups to take them over are
hard to find  (Zimbabwe, 1991).  The one collective  cooperative  in Zimbabwe  judged to be
successful  has in fact parce'ed out its land and operates as a quasi-Model  A scheme, a
smallholder  model with nucleateu s""ttlements  (Mumbengegwi,  1984).  Resettlement  in Kenya
displayed a wide range of variants, among which was a pattem of private individuals  and
companies  purchasing farms which subsequently  did not succeed as large-scale units. These
units were later subdivided  and resulted in a pattern which resulted in a better match between
farm sizes and household  resources anJ managerial  skills (Deininger and Binswanger,  1992).
Individual  tenure on the arable portion of land is c.ten combined with common  ownership
and management  of pasture land and forest resources, as in the Mexican ejido system  and
Zimbabwe's Model A schiemes. Little literature exist3  which deals with common  property
management  in settlement  projects.A
The review shows no clear advantage for ownership in contrast to secure usufructuary  rights
or long leases, so long as land rights are unequivocally  spelled out.  During an initial period,
spontaneous  settler communities  in Bolivia often provide only for usufructuary  rights which
can be reallocated  when unsuccessful  settlers  leave.  These usufruct rights only harden  to
ownership rights over time, as under the ejido  system in Mexico, where they now have been
converted into full ownership rights.  The Mexican  irrigation systems were largely settled
with ejidatarios  who until recently only enjoyed permanent  and inheritable  rights of usufruct
(Heath, 1992). The five-to-ten  hectare plots of the schemes in Northwest  Mexico were the
-6-original kome of the green revcolution  and have been associated  with highly modem farming
ever since.  A positive example for leases is the experience  of the Family Farms resettlement
schemes  in Zambia, where 14-year  inheritable  leases were granted to settlers very quickly
(Bomford, 1973).  C..ana  provides another case where the use of ieases '.,as been positive.
Technical efficiency and econoriic viability are bcs, achieved  by a program design that
promotes individual  landholding  through  the issue of freehold titles or other long-term
usufructuary agreement. Despit; the obvious  association  between security of tenure and
success of settlement, there is an almost universal tendency  to withhold title to ownership
even where full private ownership  is the intended  legal framework. Formal document-ition  of
usufruct rights is even more seldom  achieved. Withh,olding  title is often justified by the
indebtedness of settlers to the land reform or settlement  agency, even long after it is clear
th;  the debt will never be recovered  or inflation has reduced the debt to nominal amounts.
Where title or c'ear rights have been withheld, this has perpetuated  administrative
approaches.  Such was the case in Paraguay, where state land was allocated but titles were
withheld for two decades, and in Burkina  Faso, where the government  remained unclear
about its land ownership policy almost  20 years after settlement  began (Murphy and Sprey,
1980). In the case of the Dandakaranya  project in India, the failure to confer land ownership
rights for as long as two decades after land aLlotment  had been completed led to unrest and a
mass exodus of settlers (Bose, 1983).
Associated w;th unclear definition  of land rights and with the withholding  of title or other
documentation  of usufruct  rights are poor access to credit and a lack of investment--as  in the
cases of Burldna Faso, Costa Rica, Zimbabwe.  Kenya and Indonesia--and  an exacerbation  of
intergeneraticvial  problems. The experience of Kenya and Thailand shows that granting titles
can be managed even where the agricultural  sector is characterized  by very large numbers  of
small holdings (Jones and Richter, 1982; Haugeraud, 1983;  Scholz, 1986; Green, 1987;  and
Manshard and Morgan, 1988).
Consiraints to sales of land in settlements  are widespread. Where spontaneous settlements  ar
carried out by communities,  such as the Mennonites  in Brazil or Bolivia, or the traditional
-7--Indian groups and farmers unions in Bolivia, sales to outsiders are usually  prohibited  or
sharply constrained, and such patterns should really be regarded as communal  t%-nure
systems. In these cases, land title provides little advantage for accessing  official  credit
schemes, since alienability  is restricted. On the other hand, sales and rental to members  of
the community  are usually allowed.
In official settlement  schemes there is a uni,orm tendency to outlaw  sales and rental to
outsiders as well as among the beneficiaries  of the settlement  schemes. Very often, the
restrictions  or conditions imposed  on land rights and transactions  are a reflectTon  of the
desire to retain tight administrative  control over settlers,  A cornmci argument  invoked is
that wiLhout  such conditions the settlers  would either sell or pledge the land and thus become
landless, or subdivide  the land among  their heirs and make the holdings  uneconomic.
Prohibitions  on the rental or sale of lvir. are however almost uniforaily damaging  since they
lead to conflict and result in land being left idle.  In Costa Rica, when land was abandoned
by plotholders,  no one else could use it.  While being expected to forgo their rights to land
in their area of origin, settlers in Zimbabwe  not only are prohibited  from selling  or leasing
their plots but also enjoy no intergenerational  security of tenure on settlement  land.  The
early emphasis on welfare objectives  in the resettlement  program resulted in significant
numbers of destitute settlers who could not use all the land allotted to them and who, unless
they rented or sold, became  victims of wland-poaching'  (Zimbabwe, 1991).  Destitute
settlers increasingly  engage in illicit land sales and leasing.  Restrictions  on rental and sales
can rarely be enforced and, if partially enforced, the regulations  tend to create a climate of
insecurity of tenure and lead to efficiency  losses and idle land.
The evidence is overwhelming  that static approaches  to tenurial arrangements,  if rigidly
enforced, 'iead  ultimately to stagnation,  or if the administering  authority  lacks the power or
will to en'orce tenure regulations, to unrest and upheaval.  Programs need to be deliberately
designed as experiments, incorporating  a range of possible approaches. One way to do this
may be to configure the inidal allocation  so that not all the land is allocated, reserving some
,!~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~8to permit later flexibility,  and allow rent, sale, transfer and subdivision.  'Lcarning-by-
doing'  has often been invoked as a rule of thumb by resettlement  agencies, which
subsequLatly  pursue rigid programs.
(b) Scale  of program
There is little we can say about whether or not scale is associated  with success. The
literature gives equally positive ratings to programs as small as the Family Farms schemes in
Zambia and as massive  as the programs of the Malaysian  Federal Land Development
Authority (FELDA). Other large-scale programs, as in Ethiopia or the case of villagization
in Tanzania, have been judged largely failures. More significant  than physical scale appear
to be the time scale for implementation,  the flexibility  in the program and the quality of staff
involved with implementation. Rapid, overly ambitious  implementation  is always associated
with failure in at least some dimensions  and frequently  involves  costly and socially  disruptive
resettling of populations  that have already been moved  once.
(c) Size of holding
Ihe size of the holding  allocated to settlers is an important  factor in attracting them and
determinhig  agricultural  incomes.  A recent review  of the literature on economies  of scale
(Deininger and Binswanger,  1992) suggests that the area which a farm family can operate
efficiently depends  on the amount of family labor, the managerial  skills of the farmer, the
machines and capital stock  owned by the farmer, and the access to credit markets. An
approach based on these considerations  was taken in the Family Farm settlements  in southern
Zambia, where holding  sizes and the ratio between arable and grazing land were determined
in response to each settler household's labor, livestock  and initial capital endowment.
Few settlement  programs however explicitly  allocate  land according to the factors  discussed
above.  Instead two principles are frequently  used to determine  holding size:  1) farms must
not be larger than settlers can cultivate (often using only family resources), and 2) farms
-9-must be large enough to provide settlers with an income higher than they had previously but
not so high that tensions develop  between favored settlers and existing farmers.  The review
found that the resulting rules are often inflexibly  employed. Extreme  rigidities in land
allocation  have characterized  the programs in Zimbabwe  and Indonesia  (Kinsey, 1983;
Uhlig, 1984; Kebshull, 1986;  Fasbender  and Erbe).  In contrast, FELDA in Malaysia has
over more than two decades modified  several times (in response  to changing market prices
and income-earning  possibilities)  the size of the 'standard'  holdings  allocated to its settlers
(Ogawa and Chan, 1985;  Bahrin, 1988).
Excessive  allocations of land to farmers with little family labor, poor farming skills and poor
access to credit should therefore be expected to lead to poor results.  In Sudan's Gezira
Scheme, for example, many of the settlers became absentee  landlords  because the land
allocated  to them initially far exceeded  the labor capacity of their families (Sabry, 1970).
Additional  evidence supporting  the benefits to be gained from allocating relatively small
holdings  comes from the official  low- and high-density  settlement  programs in Kenya. While
the low-density  schemes were on better land and required greater levels of capital assets and
farming skills than did the high-density  schemes, they returned lower levels of social profit.
(In Kenya, the early studies of economic  performance  on resettlement  schemes also
demonstrated  that smallholders  could make more intensive  use of land previously cultivated
by large farms (von Haugwitz, '972).  One estimate put the increase  in production arising
from the shift from large to small farm units in the range of 15 to 90 percent (Deininger ano
Binswanger, 1992)). Similarly,  in the higher potential  areas of Zimbabwe, yields, production
and incomes from the 5-hectare  plots of arable land outstripped  planners' conservative  targets
for Model A schemes.  The Model B schemes, on the other hand, with an average size of
more than 9.8 ha of mostly  prime land, have been disasters (Zimbabwe  1991).
On the other hand, in Indonesia's resettlement  schemes, two hectares of land were allocated
for a long time based on an assumed irrigated rice paddy farming system, which did not
develop in many of the programs (Hardjono, 1977).  Under rainfed farming this amount of
land was clearly insufficient. In Zimbabwe's lower-potential  areas, where the 'standard
-10-holding" was unable to generate sufficient  output, government  reports show that growing
numbers  of settlers  have been  Willegally'  extending  their arable areas (Zimbabwe, 1991).
Much the same response pattern was found in Indonesia  (Fasbender  and Erbe).
There is evidence  both that larger holdings  are more privately remunerative  (Kenya and
Malaysia)  and evidence that smaller holdings  are socially more profitable (Kenya)  and lower-
cost producers (Bolivia). The characteristic  critically associated  with success appears to be
flexibility  with respect to farm size.  Flexibility  is positively associated  with the use of
purchased  inputs, lower levels of social conflict, greater income-earning  possibilities,  growth
of mutual-help  efforts, and fewer administrative  problems.  Nevertheless  the literature
reflects the fact that many rigid administrative  systems do not respond to errors in farm size,
but persist in allocating  what has been found ineffective.
(d) Type of scheme organization  and administration
Management  and administration  are important  in determining  a program's degree of success,
and the review revealed a wide variety of patterns.  A broad typology  of styles of
organization  and administration  includes the following:
o  Admin6itered, official settlement.  The classic example  here is Mexico's land
reform, in which land was administered  and settled over a 50-year period. with a top-down
approach, and an enormous land reform bureaucracy  which withheld  title for decades.'
Others include programs in Indonesia, Zimbabwe,  Ethiopia, Guatemala,  Burkina Faso and
irrigated resettlement  in Kenya. Typically,  the administering  authority is involved  in every
aspect  of resettlement: from land acquisition  through settler selection,  to infrastructure and
irrigation  development,  to extension, and to post-production  activities.
Perhaps the most dominant and damaging  characteristic  in almost all the administered
programs examined  is excessive  patemalism  on the part of the administering  authority and
associated  personnel.  The adverse consequences  of paternalism  are worse when it is
-11-centrally administere_.  and less when administration  is local. The costs of centrally
administered  paternalLm are seen most vividly in the case of Ethiopia, but the evidence
strongly suggests that central organizations  perform rather poorly everywhere.  Support for
this claim is also found in the case of Indonesia, where resettlement  performance  improves
when responsibility  for administration  is handed from the central agency to the provincial
administration  at the end of the first five years (Oey and Astika, 1978).
There have however been important  differences  in administrative  style,  t-.d many of these
differences have been generated as responses to the challenge  of manr,  what are
inherently multisectoral  projects.  In Zimbabwe, for example, the Min  - f Agriculture
does the planning  and technical  preparation work, including  land surveys  .s  setting  out
plots.  The Department  of Rural Development  of the Ministry of Local Govelxament  selects
the settlers, moves them onto the plots and chairs the coordinating  committee  which then
secures infrastructure investments,  social services and agricultural  extension from the
ministries in charge.  It also controls the development  of rural service centers.  In an effort
to strengthen implementation  capacity and avoid time-consuming  attempts at coordination,
Zimbabwe's major resettlement  agency is currently seeling to expand its authority and
control, in the face of resistance from other agencies  with settlement-related  roles, and to
become a more centralized  resettlement  agency (Zimbabwe  1991). Land reform agencies  in
Central America have all attempted to become centralized  multisectoral  development  agencies
for their clientele, with very poor results.  Such a centralized  administrative  approach  was
also implemented  in Indonesia,  but there the management  was handed over to local
authorities after the fifth year of each settlement  project. In Malaysia, a centralized
settlement institution  has handled execution  at the local level very effectively through  the
extensive involvement  and collaboration  of local government  institutions, however the
development of even more localized institutions  suited to settler needs has been discouraged
(Bahrin, 1988). Kenya largely managed  to avoid the dilemmas  involved in a centralized
agency by 1) maximizing  the involvement  of existing local-level  institutions and 2) using a
task-force approach to staff a new, temporary, central task force through secondment  of
serving staff from other institutions. 7
-12-A comprehensive  analysis of land settlement  in Latin America  is provided by Nelson (1973).
In his examination  of 24 schemes, he recognized  five different categories: directed, semi-
directed and spontaneous  settlement,  private land settlement  schemes, and foreign
colonization. His ranlcing  of the 24 schemes  indicates that directed settlement  projects have
the poorest performance record:  "Few spheres of economic  development  have a history of,
or a reputation for, failure to match that of government-sponsored  colonization...  the evidence
is irrefutable' (Nelson: 265).
While many of the examples  from the rest of the world confirm this view, Kenya's and
Malaysia's cases show that the pitfalls of government-sponsored  settlement  can be reduced by
strong involvement  of local govemments. The finite horizon of the Kenyan task force
approach  and of the Indonesian  handover  to local governments  has avoided the emergence of
perpetual  paternalism characteristic  even of the FELDA schemes  in Malaysia or of
Zimbabwe's open-ended  commitments.
For the most part, paternalism  is founded  upon good intentions--the  wish to see settlers do
well and to shield them from excessive hardships  in the early stages of the resettlement
process. But these good intentions  are also almost always linked to a profound failure to
appreciate  that continued control and coddling  of settlers in the later stages of the
resettlement  prc(ess is more damaging  than inadequate support in the earliest stages.
Patemalism  is also however strongly  linked to institutional  self-interest  and a profound
misconception  of the processes involved  in making resettlement  effective  for the communities
involved. The implicit idea appears  to be that somehow  resettlement  programs can be
successful  only if administrative  support is maintained.
Paternalism  expresses itself in excessive  constraints on settlers' decisions  on production
techniques  and crop choices, land rental and sale, labor market participation,  investment, and
marketing. Several of these constraints  are discussed  in other sections  of the paper.  Some
of the patemalistic rules arise because many of the agencies  pursue a full-time
-13-entrepreneurial  farmer model, and seek to create small replicas of commercial  farms or
plantations. In Zimbabwe, for example, the concern with commitment  to full-time  farming
went so far that, for more than a decade, settlers  were prohibited from participation  in the
nonfarm labor market'.  This commitment  to the full-time  fanning model  ignores the fact
that the strategies of small farmers all over the world, including in the developed  countries,
involves  the combination  of farm and nonfarm sources of income within the same household.
Given the severe credit constraints faced by small farrners, the insistence on several
uncorrelated  income sources must be considered  a wise portfolio diversification.
A good example  of concem-motivated  paternalism  is provided by the belief that settler-
controlled  purchases of inputs or sales of outputs would result in less favorable  prices due to
settlers' lack of experience and information. This same concern may reflect a wish to
control the harvest fully as a way to ensure credit repayment  or at least to know the precise
credit repayment  capacity of each settler.  Such has been the case in the program of the
Fundacidn  del Centavo  (FUNDACEN--also  known as the Penny Foundation)  in Guatemala,
where settlers have so far been denied the knowledge  and experience that would  equip them
to manage  input purchases and commodity  marketing  themselves  (Dunn, 1992).  The
FUNDACEN  program has a very committed  field staff but has not avoided paternalism, even
though it is a private foundation. Indeed it appears that highly committed  field staffs tend to
design paternalistic  approaches  irrespective  of their sectoral  affiliation.
Technical staff often fail to understand that they are participating in a new and different
system. Recognizing  that settlers are to be encouraged  in their new role as owners, lessees
or other rights-holders,  and treated as independent  decision-makers  who tend to do the best
within the constraints imposed by nature, their limited assets and skills, and their access to
markets. Instead, technicians  often behave as if they were foremen or overseers for their
institutions. In Zimbabwe, some resettlement  officers have been accused of dictatorial
behavior, while in Guatemala technical  staff behave  as if settlers could be "fired" for small
or imagined  infractions (Dunn, 1992).
-14-0
. Unauthorized or spontaneous settlement.  Some indication  of the global
importance  of spontaneous  settlement  is given by a World Bank (1978) study which showed
that almost 75 percent of new rural land settlement  in the late 1970s was spontaneous
settlement. There is far greater flexibility  in spontaneous  settlement,  and a range of
arrangements  is possible for land acquisition. It is often the case that spontaneous  settlers
negotiate for land with existing farmers as in Indonesia,  where land may be purchased,
rented or acquired under traditional  arrangements. Settlement  is often community-based,  as
in the Eastemn  Lowlands  of Bolivia,  where the Mennonites  purchase lands and then parcel it
out to their members, and where highland Indian communities  establish settlement  outposts
for some of their members  in the unoccupied  lowland  forests (Solem  et al.,  1985). A case of
communities  moving  as a whole is provided by the Tangwena  people in eastern Zimbabwe.
Pre-existing, self-selected  settler groups tend to have strong cohesion and resilience, but they
have by and large been prohibited  from participating  in official  programs.  In the case of
Bolivia, for example, the approach was changed to admit such groups only after administered
settlement  failed.  In Brazil, where the Mennonites  carried out a resettlement  program
entirely on their own, their projects, as well as many private schemes, have been generally
far more successful  than public  ones.
There have been numerous  administrative  responses to spontaneous  settlers, or squatters,  as
they are often called.  One has been the perpetuation  of paternalistic  systems in almost all
cases except perhaps Kenya  and Indonesia.  In Costa Rica and Honduras, where hundreds of
farms were taken over by synd-ates of settlers, the administration's  response was to
incorporate these groups into the land reforr.. prograrn, expropriate and (partly) compensate
the former landowners, and incorporate the settlements  into the land reform agencies'
paternalistic  programs.  Settlers  were then prohibited from selling or renting their 5-to-10-
hectare parcels.  At the other extreme from such forms of ex-post regularization and
conversion to official programs are overtly hostile responses, often practiced alice by
colonial and post-independence  govemments, of buming and bulldozing  settlers into at least a
temporary withdrawal. A middle road is taken in Zimbabwe,  where spontaneous  settlers
-15-have taken over pasture land and stream  banks in existing resettlement  schemes  and
undertaken  preemptive settlement  on new properties acquired for resettlement. Here political
and social sensibilities  have been paramount, and only after a decade of handling  rural
squatters with fastidious  concem have attitudes shifted toward hostility  on the part of official
settlement  agencies and beneficiaries  of official settlements.
Despite the very high costs associated  with so many official programs, there appears to have
been no comparative, ex-post, cost-benefit  analysis  of spontaneous  settlement.  In part this
lacuna reflects the fact that few public  resources were used by the spontaneous  settlers, but it
can be assumed that -nva e individuals  or communities  would not continue to expend
resources if they were not reaping  positive returns.  Even less work has been done on the
self-management  capabilities  of spontaneous,  or private sector settlements. The experience
of Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia seems to be very positive in this regard (Solem  et al.,  1985;
Ozorio de Almeida, 1992), but more systematic  enquiry is needed into the conditions which
are required for community-based  management  of settlements.
- Asslsted, spontaneous settlement.  One alternative to administered  settlement  is to
allow land to be invaded and then to regularize the occupiers.'  Indeed, spontar.eous  settlers
sometimes  seem to opt for the self-managed  route as a remedy to avoid defects in
administered  schemes. In other cases spontaneous  settlement  frequently  follows in the tracks
of official settlement, often eventually  surpassing  official settlement  in importance  and
success, as in the case of Indonesia  (Hardjono, 1986; Scudder, 1986). In Kenya, it has been
argued that large-scale spontaneous  settlement  was a direct consequence  of the official
programs (Mbithi and Barnes, 1975;  Leo, 1984; Mwagiru, 1986). A logical  extension of
these experiences  is to design programs which provide selected  infrastructure,  land
regularization  and agricultural services to spontaneous  settlers.  Such a strategy has been
pursued with apparent success in Bolivia after the directed settlement  approach  failed, was
abandoned  by external funding  agencies  and was unable to get domestic  budget support.
Assisted, spontaneous  settlement  has also achieved  considerably  more success than official
settlement  programs in Zambia.
-16-Assistance before and after settlement  may come from either private or public organizations,
or both.  In the case of the Family Farms settlements  in Zambia, for example, success was
achieved in enabling former squatters to become  productive settlers by coordinating--through
a nongovernmental  organizat  on--inputs from the government  and expertise and resources
from a commercial  bank (Bomford, 1973; Kinsey, 1979).
(e) Combinations  of Settlement  with Contract Farming
Some of the classic plantation  crops lend themselves  very well to resettlement  where forms
of contract farming may be practiced.  Because  of the need to coordinate closely  production
and processing, sugar lends itself either to contract farming, as in some of the irrigated
resettlement  in Zimbabwe's lowveld, or a core estate which provides opportunities  for nearby
settlers to supplement  their income through seasonal  wage labor (Kelly, 1972; World Bank,
1984; Stanning, 1984; Rukuni, 1988).  Contract farming approaches have worked well in the
case of tea in Kenya and settlements  involving  palm oil in Malaysia.  Settlement  agencies
have operated successful  contract farmer schemes  in the Gezira scheme in Sudan and in
Zimbabwe.  On the other hand, the weak performance  of Zimbabwe's Model C tobacco-
growing schemes suggests  that contract farming alone cannot circumvent  other problems
(Zimbabwe 1991). FUNDACEN successfully  uses contract farming models  for vegetable
production in its Guatemala settlements  (Dunn 1992). Dairying also displays  potential as a
productive activity for resettlement;  it has been highly successful  in the Nandi medium-scale
resettlement areas northwest  of Nairobi in Kenya (Metson, 1979) but has been plagued with
problems when implemented  in the form of a Model C scheme in Zimbabwe.
(f) Modalities  of land acquisition
Where land for settlement  is not owned by governments,  as in the case of Bolivia or can be
acquired under customary law, as in Indonesia, lard acquisition presents no major problem.
Elsewhere the government  must acquire the land either by purchase at market prices or
expropriate the land as part of a land reform program with no, partial, or full compensation.
-17-Alternatively,  land must be purchased by communities such as the Mennonites, by nonprofit
organizations  such as FUNDACEN,  or by private settlement  companies. There is nu
evidence that the mode of acquisition,  or the leve! of compensation  paid has a strong impact
on the ultimate  performance of settlements.
However the level of compensation  required either from government  or nongovernment
purchasers strongly influences  the scope of the settlement  programs, since budgets for
resettlement  programs are often sharply constrained.  As discussed  in Binswanger, Deininger
and Feder (1992), only a fraction  of the land costs can be expected  to be recovered from
poor settlers if compensation  is paid at the market price of land.  The requirement of a grant
component together with limited budget  allocations have confined  land reform and settlement
programs in Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala  and Brazil to very small areas.  British budget
resources were used to finance  land purchases in the Kenyan  case, and in Z%mbabwe  the
British government's share in resettlement  programs was 50 percent of all settlement  costs,
allowing  for greater scope, if not necessarily  for greater speed (Leo, 1984; Cusworth and
Walker, 1988).
(g) Settler selection  rules and practice
Settlement  is a difficult process in which the settlers must adapt to new environments  and at
the same time create productive  enterprises.  Failure is common  and dropout rates can be
high.  To deal with the consequences  of dropout requires greater flexibility in land
allocation, as discussed in the previous section.  Better settler selection can reduce later
dropout, even though it cannot eliminate  it.
Issues of settler selection arise in relation to directed, spontaneous  and private resettlement.
Of course, in the case of spontaneous  or private settlement, it is the individuals or the
communities  which do the selecting themselves. Relying on such self-selection  is likely to
lead new communities which are more socially representative  and cohesive than those which
might be created through rigid application  of a narrow set of criteria.  But what has received
-18-most attention in the literature, even though few generalizations  flow from it, is selection  in
official resettlement programs. It is this experience therefc  -e that we draw upon here.
A point-scoring system has been adopted by FELDA in Malaysia  and is under consideration
in Zimbabwe.  The specific  traits desired in resettlement  communities  are clearly spelled out
and defined objectively.  The value of a scoring scheme depends  on how closely the scoring
variables are related to ultimate  settler success.  The following  traits are most commonly
taken into consideration in such scoring systems.
Selection criteria  j  Performance  outcome
Age  Experience shows those  aged under about 45 are generally the
most successful.
Education  There is strong evidence that better-educated  settlers are more
successful  than those less-well-educated.
Family labor force  Agricultural and economic  performance  is strongly positively
associated  with the number of family members able to work.
Marital status  Married settlers almost invariably  outperform those not
married.
Farming experience and  A background  which includes farming experience and skills is
skills  strongly  predictive of good performance.
Capital assets  There is no consistent evidence  in favor of selecting as settlers
those who already have capital or assets.  Settlers who have
gone into schemes well-equipped  have fared no better than
those who have had little. In otherwise sound projects, capable
settlers seem able to accumulate  capital and acquire assets
remarkably quickly.
-19-Nationality  No clear evidence.
No prior criminal  record  No clear evidence.
Although we found no consistent  evidence to favor selection as settlers of those with capital,
we did find fairly consistent evidence that choosing  settlers with an excessive  emphasis  on
equity leads to problems.  It seems to be a fact of life that agricultural settlement  schemes,
except in special circumstances, do not make good welfare programs. While the landless
may be able to make good use of the new resources provided by settlement,  the elderly, the
sick and disabled, and those with an inadequate  labor force are unlikely  to do so, hence there
needs to be a careful balance between suitability  and need.
In the point-scoring  scheme used by FELDA in Malaysia, the set of basic criteria have
remained largely unchanged over time, but the weights attached to different  levels of each
criterion have changed frequently (Bahrin, 1988). Thus weights might be changed, for
example, to favor those with particular skills where experience was indicating  that these
skills were in short supply in schemes, or weights  could be altered to give preference to
younger candidates where unemployment  among school-leavers  had assumed a higher
priority.
One other point should be made here.  Where formal selection procedures  are employed, it
seems important that they incorporate a briefing for would-be settlers. Problems have arisen
in every case examined where settlers went into schemes with unrealistic  expectations  as to
what was involved  in resettlement  or how long it would take for incomes to reach certain
levels."' Those who are most disillusioned  are usually the first to leave.
(h) Restrictions  imposed on settlers
It is commonplace  to find that, in addition to restrictions imposed on dealings in land, set lers
-20-are almost always subjected  to rules and regulations  affecting  what-crops they can grow, how
they can grow them, when and where they can sell the produce, for whom they can and
cannot work, where and how they can build their houses, and so on.  We found no single
case where rules li;.dting purchasing  of inputs and marketing  of outputs had a positive
impact.  In Guatemala,  for example, settlers have been denied the opportunity  to develop
sldlls and acquire knowledge  that will be vital to their success as independent  operators
(Dunn, 1992). Except for those growing horticultural  products, scheme administrators  have
insulated settlers from anything  that looks like a market.
Re.strictions  on crops that may be grown are so frequentdy  ignored, in whole or in part, that
one is surprised  to see them reappear in one new project after another.  Except where the
restrictions have a sound market or agronomic  foundation,  such as the need to meet certain
rotational requirements, for example, settlers tend to grow the crops that meet the
requirements  of their families and find a ready local market. The experience of the AW
(Autonte des Ananagemenms  des Vallies des Volta)  in Burlina Paso shows this very clearly
(Murphy and Sprey, 1980;  McMillan, Painter and Scudder, 1990).  Where administrators
have managed  to enforce restrictions, as in Guatemala  and parts of Indonesia, the result has
been resentment, malnutrition  and lower levels of inco-ne. Where settlers have been free to
alter cropping patterns (as in the cases of Zimbabwe  and spontaneous settlement  in
Indonesia), evidence  emerges of diversification  and steady growth in incomes.  A positive
example of restrictions  on cropping patterns occurs in Malaysia, where--except for the
domestic garden plot--settlers  had to grow the tree crops which FELDA bn'd  calculated  to
have the best market potential. These judgments have to date proved largely correct.
(i) Prowsion  of infrastructure  and speed  of construction
Depending upon specific  circumstances,  certain types of infrastructure-roads and water
supplies, for instance-have to be provided through some govemmental  agency.  The
evidence shows clearly that safe water suppiies  should be present when settlers move in, and
loads should follow without  much delay.  All the experience shows that poor roads result in
-21-restricted access to a wide range of services (as in Guatemala  (Dunn, 1992))  and translate to
higher costs and lower farmgate  prices (as in Indonesia  (Hardjono, 1977)). Roads have been
particularly importan! components  in fronder settlements  and in settlement  based on the
reallocation  of land from former estate or large-scale farming systems,  wlere roads had been
originally  placed to serve only the central estate or homestead.
The emphasis that everything  must bc provided before settlers arrive and must be provided
by the state is wrong.  In Zimbabwe's Model A schemes, settlers have arrived a few months
before the rains and faced the daunting  tasks of clearing, preparing and planting the land
while at the same time building  houses  and other structures.  They also have molded bricks
an  contributed labor for public buildings  like schools. In Zambia's Family Farms schemes,
settlers 1.  Jilt schools and raised funds to pay for teachers before the Ministry of Education
providrx4 'hem.
An excessiveiy  rapid pace of implementation  of directed schemes has outcomes  which are
almost always negative."  '.he one exception  here is in Malaysia, where concem grew that
having settlers involved  in all stages of implementation-clearing,  planting, building, etc--was
slowing down the pace of resettlement  to an unacceptable  degree.  The response in the case
of FELDA was to use contractors  for much of the work in the development  phase and to
stipulate that half the contractors' casual  employees  had to come from the settlement  scheme
(Bahrin, 1988).  Similar forms of contracting-for tractor-hire  or building  services, for
example-can often be organized  by the community itself, if settlers have the resources to do
so.  The experience of FELDA clearly points to the possibility  of greater use of contractors
in carrying out time-sensitive  operations.
(j) Access to and modality of supply of senvces
ErJension.  All the evidence  points clearly to a positive association  between extension  and
agricultural success.  Ir. the earliest stages of Zimbabwe's intensive  resettlement  program,
extension coverage was virtually universal  among settlers and aided them to make a major
-22-shift in production technology  (Kinsey, 1987). A similar pattern can be found in Burkina
Faso, even though  the anticipated  intensification  of cropping did not materialize  (McMillan,
1987).  Coverage  in Zimbabwe has subsequently  returned to presettlement  lev^ls, probably
reflectng a reduction in demand on the part of the settlers.  In Guatemala,  extension, has
been very top-down  and synonymous  with management. It has assisted  with adoption  of new
technologies  but has been less helpful with adaptations  to cropping systems (Dunn, 1992).
Settlers in Indonesia  received very little or no extension service, and they learned only from
their neighbors  about local cropping systems,  pests and diseases (Fasbender  and Erbe).  The
outcome has been long delays in devising  suitable  cropping models in areas where the
assumed conditions  did not exist to support  the standard cropping models.  In Ethiopia, also,
extension  services were almost nonexistent  and were certainly ineffectual  (NLSA, 1977;
Chole and Mulat, 1988).
lillage serices.  While there is evidence that tillage services may help to cope with a
specific seasonal  bottleneck or to assist settlers to overcome a conflict in timing of activities,
there is no reason why these services have to be administratively  provided. There are many
options available. Assuming  a hire-service  sector exists, settlers may elect to contract-hire
tillage services, as in Kenya and Thailand. Coupons  could be provided to enable them to do
so wi!hout  tadng an administration  with yet another responsibility. Groups may also
purchase tractors and then hire them to neighbors  and others.  There should  be no
administrative  barriers to any of the possible  options.
Transport. Precisely the same arguments  apply to transport service.r  as to tillage
services.
Marketing. In general, the naeire of the marketing  system needed to facilitate  success is
related to, first, the crop or crops grown and, second, the destination. There are three broad
patterns.  The first involves central processing,  often with credit recovery tied to marketing.
Two crops in this category are oil palm and sugar cane.  Second are fruits and vegetables for
long-distance  marketing. In Guatemala,  settlers  growing horticultural products operated
-23-successfully  with  a contract  firming system  (Dunn, 1992). The same  has been  true of small-
scale  growers  in Kenya  (Schapiro  and Wainuna, 1989). Marketing  cooperatives  can also
work in these  circumstances,  although  intensive  cooperative  development  support  must  be
anticipated  for some  time. Finally,  in the case of grains  and subsistence  crops, and of fruit
and vegetables  for local  markets,  no marketing  problems  are likely  to emerge.
Malaysian  settlers,  growing  for the export  market,  have  had their crops  processed  centrally
on the schemes  and successfully  marketed  by specialized  agencies. In Guatemala,  by taking
marketing  out of the hands  of the settlers,  the authorities  are creating  an organization  that
will not be able  to leave  even  when  the time has come  for it to do so.  Zimbabwe's
experienced  marketing  parastatals  have  generally  proved  efficient  in handling  the crops  of
settlers.
Credit. Credit  can be considered  under  two categories,  that for land purchase  and that
for other purposes.
Where  credit has been  made  available  for land purchase  with  no grant  element  included,
efforts  to recover  the full  cost  universally  failed. There  is large-scale  default  and a
consequent  withholding  of title. Thus there must be a substantial  grant  component  in the
program  to provide  for the missing  equity  of many  poor beneficiaries,  although  own-equity
can  play a part in the purchase  of land of the not-so-poor.  Credit  can then be employed  to
top up settlers' resources,  therefore  assisting  settlement  to serve  both the poor and those
more  asset-rich. The two approaches  can also  be successfully  combined.
Credit  for other  purposes  also  has a poor recovery  record. In Costa  Rica, all recovery  was
poor. In Guatemala,  FUNDACEN  itself  recovers  loans,  but it is too early to judge overall
patterns. In the Indonesian  program,  where the program  itself  administers  credits,  recovery
is bad, at least  during  the first  5-year  period  (Otten, 1986;  World  Bank, 1988). The
Malaysian  experience  has generally  been  positive,  si-ne all credit  recovery  can easily  be
linked  to marketing  (Bahrin,  1988). Credit  in Malaysia  has  been  used  to support  tree crops
-24-with long maturity  periods.  Payback periods have therefore been correspondingly  long.  In
Zimbabwe,  after a short trial period, the pre-existing credit system has been used, but
defaults caused  by drought .nean that many settlers have now been outside the formal credit
system for almost a decade (Zimbabwe,  1992).
Alternatives  to institutional  and other credit also need to be considered. For example, in
Indonesia,  it was only the fact that many spontaneous  settlers were able to work as wage
laborers that enabled them to accumulate  enough assets to begin farming on their own behalf
(Hardjono, 1986).  Some sort of arrangement  like this will be critical in many cases if asset
accumulation  or funding of seasonal  inputs is to be possible. In the second phase of
Zimbabwe's intensive  resettlement  program, for example, the previously  strict prohibition
against off-farn employment  has been relaxed considerably,  in part in order to allow settlers
who have fallen out of the institutional  credit net to meet their own needs for funding." 2
Settlers must have surpluses  on a continuing  basis if recovery is going to be possible.  If
commercially  viable crops are grown so that credit is not burdensome,  recovery is not a
problem.  Recovery  of credit through  output marketing has been the most successful
approach.
Irrigation. There are two possibilities  for resettlement  based on irrigation.  The first of
these is to sulbdivide  existing irrigation schemes. The second possibility is to create new
irrigated resettlement  schemes. There have been highly successful  examples of irrigation
investment  for land reform beneficiaries  -Mexico,  for exarnple  - but none we hive
identified  involved  subdivision  of existing  irrigation schemes  or resettlement  over long
distances. Irrigation is represented  in the cases of Zimbabwe, Kenya, Indonesia  and
Ethiopia. Experience  in these countries  shows three things clearly.  First, it is better to
create irrigation  schemes first, and then parcel them out as a second stage.  It is a mistake to
allocate  land holdings on the assumption  that irrigation will go in, when--as  in the cases of
Ethiopia and Indonesia--the  necessary  pumps and equipment are not provided or the area is
subsequently  judged unsuitable  for irrigation  (NLSA, 1977; Oey and Astika, 1978). The
-25-second characteristic  of irrigation in resettlement  schemes  thus demand even more effective
extension  services than rainfed farming (Clayton, 1978; Stanning, 1984; Rukuni, 1988;
Wakjira, 1977). Finally, irrigated resettlement  projects have tended to withhold secure rights
to land and to maintain  settlers on short-term,  renewable  tenancies, particularly  in state-
sponsored  projects in Africa.
(k) Social  services
The approaches  to the provision of social services  in settlement  programs are so varied and
performance  is niixed.
In Tanzania, the provision services such as clean water, primary education  and health
services was the primary justification for the massive  villagization  program.  In this case, the
improvements  made have had significant  positive benefits,  albeit at a very great economic
and social cost (Oberai, 1988b). In other cases, such as Kenya, Ethiopia and the Brazilian
Amazon, there is evidence that settlement  increased  the need for services such as health
because the resettlement  process itslf  heightened  exposure  to diseases, raised the incidence
of malnutrition  and increased the rate of child mortality  (Clayton, 1978; Wood and Schmink,
1979; Goldwater, Colchester  and Luling, 1986; Woldemeskel,  1989; Dejene, 1990). The
failure of settlement  to provide safe water supplies  is also strongly associated  with increased
health risks.
In education and educational  facilities, many opportunities  exist for the participation  of
settlers in the provision of facilities and services.  In many of the cases, notably Zambia and
Zimbabwe, settlers have displayed a ready willingness  to contribute to the provision of their
own social overheads.
We have found no such clear-cut instances where housing  can be justified as a social
overhead.  Settlc. 4s in most cases appear more than willing to build housing for themselves,
although materials  grants are often needed.  If such grants are provided, they are more likely
-26-to make a strong impact at the very beginning  of a project.
(1)  Resource base
Settlement  projects on good soils and in areas with adequate  moisture to grow crops have
often been very successful. Where soil and climate have been marginal, as in certain parts
of Indonesia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe  and the Brazilian  Amazon, outcomes have been poor. In
marginal areas, especially when they are remote, only very strong  communities are
successful. For example, the Mennonites,  a cohesive, motivated  community who possess a
long-term pewective  and who can tolerate the isolation  and the slow build-up to reasonable
levels of living have successfufly  colonized  the semi-arid  Chaco of Paraguay.  There is also
evidence from Zimbabwe  that provision  of irrigation  in resource-poor  areas is likely to
amount to little more than a costly but futile attempt to circumvent  the limitations of the
environment  (Kelly, 1972;  World Bank, 1984).
(im) Cost  per beneflclary  family
If all costs-public and private-are factored in, then the full costs of resettlement are likely to
be far higher than niany studies have estimated.  In spontaneous  settlement  particularly an
enormous amount of work is done by the beneficiaries  themselves. The capitalization  of
settler effort into land improvements,  housing and infrastructure  should be valued
appropriately,  encouraged  and taken into account in settlement  programs. If a large grant
element is included in the allocation  of land to settlers, the public cost will be especially
high.  The critical, and largely unresearched,  issue here appears  to be that of the minimum
public investment needed to stimulate  a private investment  resronse of the beneficiaries.
T'ne studies examined  provide no direct evidence that higher public costs per beneficiary
family are significantly  associated  with performance  outcomes. One school of thought  on
this issue is encapsulated  by the World Bank's 1978 review of settlement  which concluded
that complex and costly projects are no more likely to succeed than more modest ones and
-27-that  project  success  is not closely  correlated  with  government  outlays  per beneficiary,  even
though  a thirshold  level of physical  infrastructure  and social  services  will  be needed. In
contradiction  to this conclusion  is that  arising  from the more-limited  review  conducted  by
Gosling  and Abdullah  (1979),  which  led the authors  to state that  land settlement  requires
heavy  levels  of investment  and the greater  the investment  the greater  are the chances  of
success. This  conclusion  however  does  not appear  to be based  on actual  cost  comparisons.
(n) Grant elements  In settlement  programs
The extent  of grants  varies  widely.  In Zimbabwe  or Ethiopia  settlers  made  no contribution  to
either  the land costs or the development  costs.  In Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Kenya,  Zambia  and
Guatemala  these  costs  are treated  as credit.  In Indonesia  they are not recovered,  so they
amount  to a de facto grant.
For given  settlement  budget  allocations,  larger  grants  reduce  the number  of beneficiaries.
Excessive  grant elements  also foster  dependency  and paternalism.  However,  we have  seer.
that where  land  is acquired  at market  prices,  a grant element  is necessary  to provide  poor
beneficiaries  with  the necessary  equity  to engage  in risky agricultural  production  and to stand
a chance  of recovering  the credit  provided  to them. And some  grant  elements  may be
essential,  such  as for initial  subsistence,  technical  assistance,  and perhaps  building  materials.
T'he  proper  mix of gants and credit, therefore  is a compromise  among  several  competing
objectives.
(o) Cost recovery
Recovery  of land loans  has been  poor, except  in Guatemala  and Kenya,  and Malaysia. In
Malaysia,  the time taken  for full  recovery  has been  in excess  of 20 years. The  pattern  for
recovery  of 3easonal  production  credit  is almost  universally  bad except  where  recovery  of
loans  is linked  to output  marketing. A positive  exception  is the experience  with  credit in
Zambis,  where  settlers  paid ground  rent  and had to open an account  with  a commercial  bank
-28-in order to obtain loans and had to deposit one-third  of the amnount  of any loan before it was
disbursed.  Recovery  was on a voluntary repayment  basis, while the penalty for
nonrepayment  was loss of the deposit and further credit facilities  (Bromford 1973).
(p) Settler groups
A great deal of evidence  points to the conclusion  that the emergence of strong, self-reliant
groups amr  ong settler communities  is a vital ingredient  in ensuring the sustainabiity of
settlement  programs. We know from experience  in Bolivia  and Brazil that where settlement
has been carried out by pre-existing  groups it has had more positive outcomes than when
done otherwise.  In some cases, groups have been discriminated  against.  In Malaysia, for
example, settlers who proposed  group-based  institutions  to meet their own needs were
regarded as disruptive  by FELDA staff (Bahrin, 1988). In Zimbahwe, the only way a group
could choose to be resettled  as a group was to opt for the collective  cooperative  model of
settlement  rather than the more popular pattemn  of individual  holdings grouped around
nucleated villages  (Zimbabwe, 1981). Where the creation of groups has been imposed--as
with the farmers' associations  in Ethiopia-outcomes have been almost universally  negative
(Dunning, 1970; Chole and Mulat, 1988).
The literature however reveals very little about the process of group formation  in those cases
where groups did not exist prior to settlement. In Kenya, studies of settlement  schemes  were
done almost entirely  by economists  and even these ceased within a short period after the bulk
of the settlement  process had been completed. 3 We thus do not know much about whether
organizations  are forming during the resettlement  process itself, how they form, what they do
or how they contribute  to the success of settlement  efforts.  It would be useful now to revisit
some of the settlement  sites in Kenya, and perhaps other areas of established settlement  as
well, to investigate  these issues.
-29-3.  CONCLUSIONS
A number of propositions  appear to be fairly firmly established  linking core characteristics  of
resettlement  to specific  outcomes. These general results on settlement  characteristics  are
useful  in avoiding coatly mistakes  in the initial design and establishment  of settlements.  We
concur with Cook and Mukendy  (1992) that the literature offers few clear guidelines for
specific  additional actions and their sequencing  which would assist settlements  in their long
term development.  The main lessons from this review are:
>  Directea schemes are designed  on the premise that 100  percent of settlers will or should
be successful.  Such outcomes  never materialize. Instead, schemes  should be designed
with the flexibility to anticipate  that some settlers will leave, whether  because of failure
or other reasons. Thus constraints  on sale, leasing and other forms of reallocation
should not be imposed as they create inefficiencies.
o Most programs have erred toward too much administration. Too much emphasis has
been given to centralized  models of settlement  in contrast to supporting  spontaneous
settlement, to greater local and community  participation  and responsibility,  and to
shared implementation  based on contracting.  If resettlement  is not decentralized,  it
cannot be flexible.  Settlement  agencies tend to adopt-implicitly or explicitly-infinite
horizons for implementation,  so that resettlement is never 'finished'  and areas are
returned to local administrations  only after a very long period of time, if ever.
o The assumption has frequently  been that every element  in resettlement  programs must
be provided to the settlers, and usually  provided before they arrive.  Very little research
however has been done on the sequence  of activities and the minimum  level of public
sector investment  needed to generate a sufficient private and community  investment
response.  The elements  of a minimum  public sector package  appear to include:  safe
water, road4, relatively  good land, extension, and subsistence  allowances. About
education  and housing, however, we can say little.
-30-o The capacity  of settlers  to generate  capital  has often  been  seriously  underestimated.
Settlements  will be more  successful  if farm  sizes  are adjusted  to agricultural  skins
experience,  the family  labor force  and the capital  available  to the settler  families.
Higher  educational  levels  on the part of settlers  will further  enhance  outcomes.
'  Land  rights  must  be clearly  defined  as ownerships  or long  term leases,  and settlers
should  be allowed  to sell  or rent  out their  land to other settlers.
. Some  grant  finance  is required  to provide  poor  settlers  with the equity  necessary  to
engage  in risky own account  farming  and repay the remaining  credit  grants  for initial
subsistence;  technical  assistance  is also  required.
. Paternalistic  constraints  on crop choice,  technology,  marketing  or labor  market
participation  are either  not enforceable  or have  adverse  impacts  on settlement  success.
* Settlements  based  on collective  cooperatives  do not work. Stich  programs  have  broken
down  everywhere  they have  been  tried.
-31-NOTES
1  TMh  large  literature  on the experience  with planned  settloment  in Africa alone  contains  numorous
examples  of programs  Judged  to have been unsuccessful  In many, if not most, dimensions.  See, for
example, Lewis, 1954; Hilton, 1959; Christodoulou,  1965; de Wilde et al,  1967; Moris, 1968;
Chambers,  1969;  Takes, 1975;  World  Bank, 1978;  Hansen  and Oliver-Smnith,  1982;  Poning, 1982;
Kinsey, 1982  and 1983;  Leo, 1984;  Scudder,  1984;  McMUlan,  1987;  and Cook  and  Mukendi,  1992.
2.  In utilizing  the concept  of a sequence  of stages  in the  development  of resettled  areas,  Nelson  (1973)
maintains  that  the stages  are generally  of longer  duration  than  most  analysts. He describes  three  stages
in the devewopment  of successful  settlements:
1.  The pioneer  stage (5-10  years),  during which  settJers  move  into an area  and establir!  basic  life-
support  systems  such  as water,  food, shelter  and  access  to consumption  goods,  markets  aid credit.
2.  The consolidation  stage  (5-10  years),  during  which  community  organizations,  educational  and  health
services,  transport  improvements,  and permanent  housing  are established  and  better  use is made  of
landholdings  and  credit.
3.  The growth  stage  (duration  unspecifled),  during  which  farms  are capitalizea,  permanent  agricultural
systems  are  established,  related  agro-industries  are  developed,  credit  becomes  generally  available,  and
supply  and  marketing  systems  are firmly  grounded.
3. See, for example,  the  cases  of Ethiopia  as documented  by NLSA  (1977)  and  Zimbabwe  as recounted
by Akwabi-Ameyaw  (1990). A similar  pattern  of failure  occurred  on the communal  plots  in Tanzania's
ujamaa  villages  (Oberai,  !988b).
4.  Four resettlement  models  have  been used in Zimbabwe:  Model  A-smallholder  farming  based  on
individual  allocations  of vrable  land,  communal  grazing  land  and  nucleated  villages,  Model  B-collective
cooperatives,  Model  C-satellite  production round  a core  estate,  and  Model  D-an experiment  to explore
options  for livestock-based  resettlement.
S.  Most of the literature  dealing  with this theme  which  we reviewed  in the preparation  of this paper
dealt  with  the issues  of resettlement  for pastoralists  and  the management  of common  grazing  lands. See,
for example,  Oxby  (1984)  and  Adams  and Devitt  (1992).
6.  See Ireson  (1987)  and  Heath  (1992)  for analyses  of the consequences  of Mexico's  long  land  reform
program.
7.  C. P. R. Nottidge,  personal  communication.
S. This  prohibition  has recently  been  relaxed  in response  to twin  crises. First, most  settlers  in the early
years of the program  received  institutional  credit but subsequently  defaulted  under the strain of the
successive  droughts  of 1982,  1983  and 1984. They  have  thus  been  ineligible  for firther loans  from  the
agricultural  credit  agency. Second,  the severe  drought  in the 1991/92  season  meant  that  many  settler
households were unable even to feed themselves and had to liquidate  assets in order to purchase food.
Condoning  off-farm  work  to allow  farmers  to acquire  operating  capital,  rebuild  assets  and  procure  food
was therefore  a prudent  reaction  to a situation  the remedy  for which  was  beyond  the scope  of the state's
resources.
-32-9. If there is no reconciliation  and negotiations  become stuck in stalemate, this is what may very well
happen in South Africa.
10. For a good example, see the discussion  of the Indonesian  transmigration  program in Kebschull
(1986)  and Fasbender and Erbe.
11. See Wakjira  (1977) for the extreme  example  of an over-zealous  pace of implementation  in Ethiopia.
12. The prohibition  may also have  been  relaxed beca.  it was difficult  or impossible  to enforce. Adams
(1991), for example, reports that on one resettlement  scheme 48 percent of women engaged in off-plot
employment  at a time when the prohibition  was still intended  to be in effect.
13. See, for example, the later studies by Clough (1968) and von Haugwitz  (1972) which are largely
based on the farm management  survey work done in the mid-1960s.
-33-REFERENCES
Adams, Jennifer M.,  "Female wage labor in rural Zimbabwe," World Development,  Vol. 19, No.2/3
(February/March  1991), pp. 163-77.
Adams, M. and P. Devitt, 'Grappling with land reform in pastoral Namibia,"  Pastoral Development
Network  Paper 32a (London:  Overseas Development  Institute, 1992).
Akwabi-Amneyaw,  Kofi, "The political economy  of agricultural  resettlement  and rural development  in
Zimbabwe:  the performance  of family farms and producer  cooperatives,"  HIuman  Organization  Vol. 49,
No. 4 (Winter 1990),  pp. 320-38.
Bahrin, Tunku Shamsul, "Land settlement  in Malaysia: a case study of the Federal Land Development
Authority  projects," in A. S. Oberal (Ed.), Land Settlement  Policies and Population  Redistribution  in
Developing  Countries: Achievements,  Problems  and Prospects  (New York: Praeger, 1988),  pp. 89-  i8.
Binswanger, Hans P.,  Klaus Deininger, and Gershon Feder,  "Power,  distortions and  reform in
agricultural land markets, forthcoming in Jere Behrman and T.  N. Srinivasan (Eds.), Handbook of
Development  Economics, Vol III, forthcoming.
Bomford, L.,  'An evaluation  of the Family Farms resettlement  schemes, Zambia," MPhil dissertation
(Reading, UK: University  of Reading, 1973).
Bose, A., 'Migration in India: trends and policies," in A. S. Oberai (Ed.), State Policies  and Internal
Migration:  Studies in Planned and Market Economies  (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1983),  pp. 137-82.
Chambers, R.,  Settlement Schemes in  Tropical Africa: A  Study of  Organizations  and Development
(London:  Routledge  & Kegan Paul, 1969).
Chole, Eishetu and Teshome Mulat, "Land  settlement  in Ethiopia: a review of developments,"  in A. S.
Oberai (Ed.),  Land  Settlement Policies and  Population Redistribution in  Developing Counmries:
Achievements,  Problens 4nd Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp.  161-201.
Christodoulou, D.,  "Land settlement: some oft-neglected  issues," Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural
Economics  and Statistics," Vol. 14, No. 10 (month, 1965),  pp.  1-6.
Clayton, Eric,  A comparative study of settlement schemes in Kenya, Agrarian Development  Unit,
Occasional  Paper No. 3 (Near Ashford, Kent, UK: Wye College, University  of London, 1978).
Clough, R. H., 'An appraisal of African  settlement  schemes  in the Kenya highlands,"  PhD dissertation
(Ithaca: Cornell University, 1968).
Colson, Elizabeth, The  Social Consequences  of Resettlement  (Manchester: Manchester  University  Press,
1971).
Cook, Cynthia  C. and Aleki Mukendi, "Involuntary  resettlement  in Bank-financed  projects: lessons  from
-34-Sub-Saharan  Africa," AFTEN  Working Paper No. 3 (Washington,  DC: Environment  Division, Africa
Technical Department,  'Me World  Bank, !992).
Cusworth, John and Judy Walker, "Land Resettlement In Zimbabwe," Evaluation Report EV 434
(London: Overseas  Development  Administration,  1988).
Deininger,  Klaus and Hans  P. Binswanger,  'Are large farms more  efficient  than small  ones? Government
intervention, large scale agriculture,  and resettlement  in Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe," World
Bank Policy Working Paper (Washington,  DC: The World Bank, forthcoming).
Dejene, Alemneh, Environment,  Famine, and Politics in Ethiopia: A View  from the Village (Boulder:
Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1990).
de Wilde,  J.  C.,  P.  Mcloughlin, A.  Guinard, T.  Scudder, and R.  Mabouche, Experiences with
Agricultural Development in  Tropical Africa:  The Case Studies (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins
University  Press, 1967).
Dunn, Elizabeth G.,  "The FUNDACEN  Experience: Factors for Success and Failure in a Guatemalan
Land  Purchase-Sale  Program," Research  Paper No. 107, Land Tenure  Center, University  of Wisconsin-
Madison. (Madison,  WI: Land Tenure Center, 1992).
Dunning, Harrison C., "Land  reform in Ethiopia:  a case study in non-development,"  UCLA  Law  Review,
Vol. 18, No. 2 (month, 1970),  pp. 271-307.
Fasbender,  Karl  and  Susanne  Erbe,  Towards  a  New  Home:  Indonesia's  Managed  Mass
Migration-Transmigration  between Poverty. Economics and Ecolo  (Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv
GMBH  for the Hamburg  Institute of Economic  Research, 1988).
Goldwater, Mike, Marcus Colchester, and Virginia Luling, Ethopia's Bitter Medicine, Settling  for
Disaster: An Evaluation of the Ethiopian Government's  Resetlement Programme (London: Survival
International, 1986).
Gosling, L. A. P. and H. Abdullah,  'Rural population  redi3tribution,"  in  L. A. P. Gosling and L. Y.
C. Lim (Eds.), Population  Redistribution:  Patterns, Policies  and Prospects  (New York: United  Nations
Fund for Population  Activities, 1979).
Green, Joy K.,  "Evaluating  the impact of consolidation  of holdings, individualization  of tenure, and
registration  of title: lessons  from Kenya," Land Tenure Center Paper 129 (Madison, WI: Land Tenure
Center, University  of Wisconsin,  1987).
Habitat, Spontaneous  Settlement  Formation  in Rural  Regions, Volume  rwoo:  Case  Studies  (Nairobi:  United
Nations Centre for Human Settlements  [Habitat], 1986).
Hansen, A. and A. Oliver-Smith  (Eds.), Involuntary  Migration  and Resettlement: The Problems and
Responses  of Dislocated  Peoples (Boulder:  Westview  Press, 1982).
Hardjono, Joan M., Transmlgration  In Indonesia (Kuala  Lumpur: Oxford  University  Press, 1977).
-35-Hardjono, Joan M., 'Spontaneous  rural settlement  in Indonesia," in Spontaneous  Settlement  Formation
in Rural Regions, Volume 7W.: Case Studies (Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
[Habitat], 1986).
Haugerud,  Angelique, 'Consequences  of land  tenure  reform among  smallholders  in the Kenya  highlands,'
Rural Africana, Vol. 15, No. 16 (Winter/Spring  1983), pp. 65-89.
Heath, J. R.,  'Evaluating the impact of Mexico's land reform on agricultural  productivity," World
Development,  Vol. 20, No. 5 (May 1992), pp. 695-711.
Hilton, T., "Land planning  and resettlement  in Northern Ghana," Geography,  Vol. 44, No. _  (ronoh,
1959, pp. 227-40.
Hulme, David, 'Land settlement  schemes  and rural development:  a review article," Sociolgia  Ruralis,
Vol. 28, No. 1 (1988), pp. 42-61.
Irson,  W. R., 'Landholding, agricultural  modernization  and income  concentration:  a Mexican  example,"
Economic  Development  and Cultural  Change,  Vol. 35, No. 2 (January 1987),  pp. 351-66.
Jones.  G. W.  and H.  V.  Richter (Eds.), 'Population resettlement programs in  Southeast Asia,"
Development  Studies Centre Monograph  No. 30 (Canberra: The Australian  National  University, 1982).
Kebschull,  Dietrich, Transmlgration  In Indonesia:  An Empirical  Analysis  of Motivation,  Expectations  and
Experiences  (Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv  GM3H for the Hamburg Institute of Economic Research,
1986).
Kelly, S. P. A., "African and European  settler and estate agriculture in the Rhodesian  Lowveld," PhD
dissertation  (Salisbury: University  of Rhodesia,  1972).
Kinsey, B.  H.,  'Agricultural extension In intensive resettlement  schemes: a case study within the
framework of the National Exension Framework  Study (Harare: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement  and
Rural Development,  Department  of Agricultural  Technical and Extension  Services, 1987).
Kinsey,  B. H., "The socioecononiics  of nutrition  under stressful conditions:  a study of resettlement  and
drought in Zimbabwe," Occasional  Paper Series (Harare: University  of Zimbabwe,  Centre for Applied
Social Sciences, 1986).
Kinsey, B. H.,  'Emerging policy issues in Zimbabwe's land resettlement  programmes,"  Development
Policy Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Yivember 1983),  pp. 163-96.
Kinsey, B. H.,  "Forever gained: resettlement  and land policy in the context of national  development  in
Zimbabwe," Africa, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1982),  pp. 92-113.
Kinsey, B. H., 'Agricultural technology,  staple  food crop production  and rural development  in Zambia,"
Monographs  in Development  Studies No. 6 (Norwich, UK: University  of East Anglia, 1979).
Leo, Christopher,  Land and aass  in Kenya (Toronto: University  of Toronto  Press, 1984).
-36-Manshard, Waither and William  B. Morgan (Eds.), Agricultural  Expansion and Pioneer Settlements  in
the Humid Tropics  (Tokyo:  United Nations University  Press, 1988).
Mbithi, Philip M. and Carolyn  Barnes, The Spontaneou,  Settlement Problem in Kenya (Nairobi: Last
African Literature Bureau, 1975).
McMilan, Della E., 'The social impacts  of planned settlement  in Burkina  Faso,'  in Michael  H. Glantz
(Ed.), Drought  and Hunger  in Aftica: Denying  Famine  a Future  (Cambridge,  UK: Cambridge  University
Press, 1987).
McMillan, Della E.,  lTomas  Painter, and Thayer Scudder, 'Land  settlement review: settlement
experiences and development  strategies in the onchocerciasis  controlled area of West Africa - Final
Report,'  IDA  Working Paper Number 68  (Binghamton, New York:  Institute for  Development
Anthropology, 1990).
Metson, Joan, 'Mixed dairying and maize farming in the Nandi high-potential  areas of Kenya," PhD
dissertation (Norwich, UK: University  of East Anglia, 1979).
Moran, E.,  'Criteria for choosing  successful  homesteaders  in Brazil,'  in G. Dalton (Ed.), Research  on
Economic Anthropology,  Vol. 1 (Greenwich,  Connecticut:  JAI Press Inc.,  1979), pp. 339-59.
Moris, J., 'The evaluation  of settlement  schemes  performance:  a sociological  appraisal," in R. Apthorpe
(Ed.), Land Settlement  and Rural Development  in Eastern  Africa (Kampala:  Nkanga Editions, 1968),  pp.
79-102.
Mumbengegwi, C.,  'Agricultural producer cooperatives  and agrarian transformation  in Zimbabwe:
policy, strategy and implementation,'  Zimbabwe  Journal of Economics, Vol. 1 (July 1984),  pp. 47-75.
Mupawose, R.M. and E. T. Chengu, 'Determination  of land policy in Zimbabwe,' Paper presented at
the Workshop on Land Policy and Agricultural Production (Gaberone, Botswana: UN University,
February 14-20, 1982).
Murphy, Josette and Leendert  H. Sprey, "The Volta Valley  Authority. socio-economic  evaluation  of a
resettlement  project in  Upper Volta'  (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdlie University, Department of
Agricultural  Econornics,  1980).
Mwagiru, Wanjiku, 'Planning for settlement in rural regions: the case of spontaneous  settlements in
Kenya,'  in Spontaneous  Settlement  Formation in Rural Regions, Volume TWo:  Case Sntdies (Nairobi:
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements  [Habitat], 1986), pp. 3-12.
Nelson, M., The Development  of Tropical  Lands (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University  Press, 1973).
Nottidge, G. P. R., personal  communication,  the Workshop  on Land Policy and Agricultural  Production
(Gaberone, Botswana:  UN University,  February 14-20, 1982).
Oberai, A. S. (Ed.), Land Settlement  Policies and Population  Distribution in Developing Countries:
Achievements, Problems  and Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1988).
-37-Oberai, A.  S.,  "An overview of settlement policies and programs," in A. S. Oberai (Ed.), Land
Settlement  Policies and Population  Distribution  in Developing  Countries: Achievements,  Problems  and
Prospects (New York:  Praeger, 1988), pp. 7-47.
Oey, Mayling and Ketut  Sudhana  Astika, 'A report from the 1nstitute  for Economic  and Social  Research
Faculty  of Economics  of the University  of Indonesia  in collaboration  with the Research  and Development
Board, Department of Manpower, Transmigration and Cooperatives,' Mimeo (Jakarta:  Institute for
Economic  and Social Research, Faculty of Economics, University  of Indonesia, 1978).
Ogawa, Naohiro and Paul T. H. Chan, "Land  settlement  programs  and issues  on the second generation:
the case of Malaysia," in Urbanization  and Migration  in ASEANDevelopment  (Tokyo: National  Institute
for Research Advancement,  1985).
Otten, Mariel, "Transmigrasi: Myths and Realities - Indonesian  Resettlement  Policy,  1965-1985,"
IWGIA  Document No. 57 (Copenhagen: International  Work Group for International  Affairs, 1986).
Oxby, Claire, "Settlement  schemes for herders in the subhumid  tropics of west Africa: issues of land
rights and ethnicity," Development  Policy  Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (November  1984), pp. 217-33.
Ozorio de Almeida, Anna Luiza, 7he Colonization  of the Amazon  (Austin: University  of Texas Press,
1992).
Reining,  C., "Resettlement  in the Zande development  scheme,"  in A. Hansen  and A. Oliver-Smith  (Eds.),
Involuntary  Migration and Resettlement:  The Problems and Responses  of Dislocated  Peoples (Boulder:
Westview  Press, 1982), pp. 201-24.
Rukuni, Mandivamba, "The evolution of  smallholder irrigation policy in Zimbabwe: 1982-1986,"
Irrigation  and Drainage  Systems,  Vol. 2, No._  (month, 1988),  pp. 199-210.
Sabry, 0.  A., "Starting  settlements  in Africa," in Land Reform, Land Settlements  and Cooperatives  No.
i (Rome: Food and Agriculture  Organization, 1970).
Schapiro, Morton Owen and Stephen  Wainaina, "Kenya:  a case study of the production and export  of
horticultural  commodities,"  in Successfil Development  in Africa:  Case  Studies  of Projects, Programs  and
Policies (Washington,  DC:  Economic  Development  Institute,  The World Bank, 1989), pp. 79-93.
Scholz, Ulrich, "Spontaneous  rural settlements and deforestation  in south-east Asia: examples from
Thailand  and Indonesia," in Spontaneous  Settlement  Formation in Rural Regions, Volwue  o:  Case
Studies (Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements  [Habitat], 1986), pp. 13-35.
Scudder,  T.,  "Interrelationships between government-sponsored  and  spontaneous settlement,'  in
Spontaneous  Settlment Formation  in Rural Regions, Volume  7Iw: Case  Studies  (Nairobi: United  Nations
Centre for Human Settlements  (Habitat], 1986), pp. 176-92.
Scudder, T.,  "Tle development  potential  of new lands settlement  in the tropics and subtropics: a global
state of the art evaluaticn with specific emphasis on policy implications," AID Program Evaluation
Discussion  Paper No. 21 (Washington,  DC: United States  Agency  for International  Development,  1984).
-38-Scudder,  T.,  'Resettlement,'  in N. F. Stanley  and M. P. Alpers (Eds.), Man-made  Lakes and Human
Health (London:  Academic  Press, 1975),  pp. 453470.
Sc-idder,  T.,  'Summary: ruettl.ment,"  in W. C. Ackermann, G. F. White, and E.  B. Worthingon
(Eds.), Man-made  Lakes:  Their Problems and Environmental Effects (Washington,  DC: American
Geophysical  Union, 1973), pp. 707-719.
Scudder, T. and Elizabeth Colson, "Long-term  research in Gwembe Valley, Zambia," in G. M. Foster
et al. (Eds.), Long-term  Field Research  in Social  Anthropology  (New  York: Academic  Press, 1979), pp.
227-254.
Scudder, T. and Elizabeth Colson, 'From welfare to development: a conceptual framework for the
analysis  of dislocated  people," in A. Hansen and A. Oliver-Smith (Eds.), Involuntary  Migration and
Resettlement: lhe Problems and Responses  of Dislocated  Peoples (Boulder:  Westview  Press, 1981).
Selassie,  Hadas Haile, Ato Ahmed Ali, and Hanna  Kebede, "Evaluation  of the Settlement  Authority and
settlement  projects" (Addis  Ababa: National  Land Settlement  Authority, 1977).
Solem,  R. R., R. J. Greene, D. W. Hess, Carol B. Ward, and P. L. Taylor,  "Bolivia:  integrated  rural
development  in a colonization  setting," AID Project  Impact  Evaluation  Report  No. 57 (Washington,  DC:
United States  Agency for International  Development,  1985).
Stanning, J. L.,  "Sabi River Basin Irrigation Projects:  Facts and issues relating to land tenure and
agricultural  productivity,  MS (Madison,  WI:  Land Tenure Center, University  of Wisconsin, 1984).
rakes,  C.,  Land Settlement and Resettlement Projects: Some  Guidelines  for  their Planning and
Implementation  (Wageningen,  Netherlands:  International  Institute  for Land  Reclamation  and  Improvement,
1975).
UJhlig,  Harald (Ed.), "Spontaneous  and planned  settlement  in Southeast  Asia," Giessener  Geographische
Schnften, Vol. 58 (Hamburg:  Institute of Asian Affairs, 1984).
von Haugwitz,  Hans-Wilhelm,  "Some  experiences  with smaltholder  settlement  in Kenya,"  Afrika-Studien
No. 72 (Munich:  Weltforum  Verlag for ILO-Institut  fur Wirtschaftforschung,  1972).
Wakjira, Fekadu, "Recent institutional  innovations  and structural transformation  of rural economies in
Ethiopia,"  Paper  presented  at the International  Seminar  on Agrarian  Reform,  Institutional  Innovation,  and
Rural Development:  Major Issues in Perspective  (Madison,  Wisconsin:  Land Tenure Center, University
of Wisconsin,  July 14-22, 1977).
Woldemeskel,  Getachew, "The cousequences  of resettlement  in Ethiopia," African  Affairs, Vol. 88, No.
352 (July 1989),  pp. 359-74.
Wood, C. H., and M. Schmink, 'Blaming  the victim:  small  farmer production  in an Amazon  colonization
project," Studies  in Third World  Societies, Vol. 7 (1979), pp. 77-93.
World Bank, Agricultural  Land Settlement  (Washington,  DC: The World Bank, 1978).
-39-World Bank,  Zimabwe Irrigation Sub-sector  Revew (Washington,  DC: The World Bank, 1984).
World Bank,  IMndonesia:  The transmigration  programme in perspective,' World Bank country study
(Washington,  DC: The World Bank, 1988).
Zimbabwe  Government,  Resettlemeat  Programme:  Policies  and Procedures (Harare: Ministry  of Lands,
Resettlement  and Rural Development, 1981).
Zimbabwe Govermb  nt, "Resettlement  progress report as of June 1991,'  (Harare: Ministry of Local
Government,  Rural and Urban Development,  Department  of Rural Development, 1991).
Zimbabwe Government,  'Second report of settler households  in normal intensive Model A resettlement
schemes - Main report" (Harare:  Ministry of Lands, Agriculture  and Rural Resettlement,  Monitoring
and Evaluation  Section, Planning  and Research Unit, 1992).
-40-Pollcy  Reseach  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1  180 The  Financing  and Taxation  of U.S.  Harry  Huizinga  September  1993  R. Vo
Direct Investment  Abroad  33722
WPS1  181 Reforming  Health  Care:  A Case  for  Zeljko  Bogetic  September  1993  F. Smith
Stay-Well  Health  Insurance  Dennis  Heffley  36072
WPS1  182 Corporate  Governance  in Central  Cheryl  W. Gray  September  1993  M. Berg
and Eastern  Europe:  Lessons  from  Rebeoca  J. Hanson  31450
Advanced  Market  Economies
WPS1  183 Who  Would  Vote  for Inflation  In  Cheikh  Kane  September  1993  T. Holiestelle
Brazil?  An Integrated  Framework  Jacques  Morisett  30968
Approach  to Inflation  and Income
Distribution
WPS1  184 Providing  Social  Benefits  in Russia:  Simon  Commander  September  1993  0. del  Cid
Redefining  the Roles  of Firms  and  Richard  Jackman  35195
and  Government
WPS1  185 Reforming  Hungarian  Agricultural  Morris  E. Morkre  September  1993  N. Artis
Trade Policy:  A Quantitative  David  G.  Tarr  38004
Evaluation
WPS1  186 Recent  Estimates  cf Capital  Flight  Stijn Claessens  September  1993  R. Vo
David  Naude  33722
WPS1  187 How  Should  Sovereign  Debtors  Andrew  Warner  September  1993  J. Oueen
Restructure  Their Debts?  Fixed  33740
Interest  Rates, Flexible  Interest
Rates,  or Inflation-indexed
WPS1188 Developmentalism,  Socialism,  and  Mario  Marcel  September  1993  S. Florez
Free  Market  Reform:  Three  Decades  Andres  Solimano  39075
of Income  Distribution  in Chile
WPS1  189 Can  Communist  Economies  Alan  Gelb  September  1993  PRDTM
Transform  Incrementally?  China's  Gary Jefferson  37471
Experience  Inderjit  Singh
WPS1190  The  Government's  Role  in Japanese  Yoon  Je Cho  September  1993  T. Ishibe
and Korean  Credit  Markets:  A New  Thomas  Hellmann  37665
Institutional  Economics  Perspective
WPS1191 Rent-Sharing  in the Multi-Fibre  Geoffrey  J. Bannister  September  1993  A. Daruwala
Arrangement:  The  Case  of Mexico  33713
WPS1192 Effects  of Tax Reform  on Argentina's Jacques  Morisset  September  1993  G. Carter
Revenues  Alejandro  lzquierdo  30603
WPS1  193 The  Armenian  Labor  Market  in  Milan  Vodopivec  September  1993  S. Florez
Transition:  Issues  and Options  Wayne  Vroman  39075Policy Rosarch  Working Paper Series
Contact
Titl  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1  194  How  Fast  Has  Chineso  Industry  Tom  Rawskl  September  1993  E.  Khine
Grown?  37471
WPS1  195  The  Enterprise  Sector  and  Mark  Schaffer  September  1993  E.  Khine
Emergence  of  the  Polish  Fiscal  37471
Crisis,  1990-91
WPS1196  Corporate  Tax  Structure  and  Jeffrey  Bernstein  September  1993  C. Jones
Production  Anwar  Shah  37754
WPS1  197  Determinants  of Inflation  among  Bruno  Boccara  September  1993  C. Jones
Franc  Zone  Countries  in  Africa  Shantayanan  Devarajan  37754
WPS1  198 Enterprise  Reform  in  China:  The  Natalie  Lichtenstein  September  1993  M.  Rangarajan
Evolving  Legal  Framework  81710
WPS1199  Public  Pension  Governance  and  Olivia  Mitchell  October  1993  D. Evans
Performance:  Lessons  for Developing  37496
Countries
WPS1200  The  Life-Cycle  Distributional  Jane  Falkingham  October  1993  D. Evans
Consequences  of Pay-As-You-Go Paul  Johnson  37496
and  Funded  Pension  Systems
WPS1  201 Five  Criteria  for  Choosing  among  Margaret  E.  Grosh  October  1993  M.  Quintero
Poverty  Programs  37792
WPS1202  Privatization  and  Foreign  Investment  Frank  Sader  October  1993  Rose  Vo
in the  Developig  World,  1988-92  33722
WPS1203  Determinants  of Value-Added  Tax  Zeljko  Bogetic  October  1993  F.  Smrh
Revenue:  A Cross-Section  Analysis Fareed  Hassan  36072
WPS1204  Structural  Adjustment,  Economic  Nisha  Agrawal  October  1993  K.  Rivera
Performance,  and  Aid  Dependency Zafar  Ahmed  34141
in  Tanzania  Michael  Mered
Roger  Nord
WPS1205  Wage  and  Employment  Decisions  Simon  Commander  October  1993  0. del  Cid
in  the  Russian  Economy:  An  Analysis  Leonid  Liberman  36303
of Developments  in  1992  Ruslan  Yemtsov
WPS1206  Empirical  Perspectives  on  National  Ishac  Diwan  October  1993  A. Yideru
Index  Funds  Vihang  Errunza  36067
Lemma  W.  Senbet
WPS1  207 Characteristics  and  Performance  Bill  H.  Kinsey  October  1993  H. Binswanger
of Settlement  Programs:  A  Review  Hans  P.  Binswanger  31871